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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
A long time ago a Pennsylvania jury convicted Steven 
L. Romansky of car theft-related crimes.  Over the decades his 
case wound its way through the Pennsylvania courts and 
eventually generated this federal habeas corpus petition in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court denied 
Romansky’s lengthy, multifaceted petition in full and declined 
to grant a certificate of appealability.  We did grant a certificate 
of appealability as to two claims related to an alleged 
discrepancy between the charging documents and the jury 
instructions at Romansky’s trial over three decades past.  But 
because we conclude that this petition is not timely as to the 
undisturbed events at that first trial, and are unpersuaded by his 
other claims, we affirm.   
I. Background 
One Pennsylvania court described this case as a 
“procedural quagmire.”  We have no quibble with that 
portrayal. 
Steven Romansky came under suspicion in 1985 for his 
involvement in an auto theft ring in northeastern Pennsylvania.  
The Commonwealth convened an investigative grand jury, and 
in May 1985 it issued Presentment No. 33.  The Presentment 
recommended charges against Romansky, among others, that 
included receiving stolen property under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925, 
conspiracy under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, removal or falsification 
of identification numbers under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(b), 
dealing in vehicles with removed or falsified numbers under 75 
Pa.C.S.A. § 7103(b), dealing in titles and plates for stolen 
vehicles under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7111, and false application for 
certificate of title or registration under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7121.  
(The presentment stated that it recommended bringing charges 
“including, but not limited to[,] the listed offenses.”)  In late 
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August 1985 the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint 
leveling the same slate of charges against Romansky.  They 
included three counts of each offense (except false application 
for certificate of title or registration), with each count 
pertaining to a different vehicle: a 1977 Pontiac Trans-Am 
Firebird, a 1979 Ford Bronco, and a 1977 GMC truck.   
As the proceedings continued, the substantive offenses 
remained intact, but the conspiracy charges changed.  At a 
preliminary hearing in September 1985, two of the three 
conspiracy counts were dismissed, and notes from the hearing 
indicate that the remaining count—dealing with the Pontiac—
was amended to conspiracy to receive stolen property.  In 
December 1985, however, a criminal information formally 
charged Romansky with conspiracy to commit dealing in 
vehicles with removed or falsified identification numbers 
and/or theft.  This information was the operative charging 
document at the time of trial. 
In May 1987 the case proceeded to trial on the 
conspiracy charge for the Pontiac and on the substantive 
charges for all three cars.  The jury acquitted Romanksy as to 
each charge relating to the GMC truck, but convicted on most 
others dealing with the Pontiac and the Bronco.  Importantly 
for our purposes, he was convicted on the conspiracy charge, 
which the jury instructions described as “conspiracy to deal in 
vehicles with removed or falsified numbers and/or theft.”  In 
explaining the elements of this charge, however, the trial judge 
omitted the “and/or theft” component and stated only that the 
jury had to find that the defendant entered into an agreement 
with others to deal in vehicles with removed or falsified 
numbers.  The verdict form indicated only that the jury found 
Romansky guilty of “conspiracy” with no elaboration. 
Romansky’s sentence in 1987 was 9 to 18 years’ total 
incarceration, including 2 to 4 years on the conspiracy charge.  
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He appealed in state court, unsuccessfully, and then brought a 
state post-conviction claim.  Among other things, he alleged 
that the evidence was insufficient to show conspiracy to deal 
in vehicles with removed or falsified numbers; and in 
responding to this argument the Commonwealth noted that the 
charge had been changed to conspiracy to receive stolen 
property.   
Ten years after the trial, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court ultimately ruled that the Commonwealth had unlawfully 
used false testimony and therefore vacated Romansky’s 
convictions as to the Bronco, but not as to the Pontiac—and 
therefore not including the conspiracy charge as to the latter.  
Romansky was retried on the vacated charges in January 2000, 
again resulting in conviction on all of those counts.  Two 
months later he received the same sentence on each of the 
counts as in 1987—9 to 18 years in total, including 2 to 4 years 
on the conspiracy charge.  Romansky later testified that he 
mentioned the discrepancy about the conspiracy charge to his 
counsel prior to his resentencing, and then asked to file a 
motion on the issue after the sentencing, but that his counsel 
did not raise the issue at any time. 
After resentencing, Romansky filed another direct 
appeal, and the Superior Court affirmed in June 2001.  He did 
not seek allowance of appeal from the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.  Instead, he filed another state post-conviction petition 
in April 2001, while his direct appeal was still pending, as well 
as several addenda to the petition in April a year later.  The 
post-conviction court dismissed the petition in June 2002, but 
the Superior Court vacated that order in September 2003, 
remanding with instructions to allow Romansky’s newly 
appointed counsel to review the petition and file an amended 
version.  His counsel ultimately filed that amendment in 
August 2008, but it was dismissed in July 2010, and again the 
Superior Court reversed in part.   
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The Court of Common Pleas appointed new counsel for 
Romansky, and immediately she engaged in a flurry of activity 
that included a Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence as to the 
conspiracy charge.  At oral argument on this motion, the 
Commonwealth’s lawyer conceded that the jury was instructed 
on the wrong charge and thus did not oppose the motion.  Yet 
the Court denied it, and in October 2013 denied all of 
Romansky’s post-conviction claims.  This time the Superior 
Court affirmed, and the Commonwealth Supreme Court denied 
allowance of appeal in February 2015. 
In the meantime, Romansky had filed a federal habeas 
petition before the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, which was held in abeyance while he proceeded 
to exhaust his state-court remedies.  Once this was done and 
the federal petition litigated, the District Court denied 
Romansky’s claims in full in a March 2017 order and denied a 
certificate of appealability.  See Romansky v. Folino, 2017 WL 
810689 (M.D. Pa. 2017).  A panel of our Court granted a 
certificate for two of the many issues raised in the petition: 
whether Romansky was convicted and sentenced for a crime 
with which he had not been charged—“conspiracy to deal in 
vehicles with falsified identification numbers and/or theft” 
instead of “conspiracy to receive stolen property”—and 
whether his lawyer during the 2000 resentencing had been 
ineffective for failing to raise this issue.  We also asked the 
parties to address whether the first claim is timely under 
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010).  Additionally, 
Romansky asks us to expand the certificate of appealability to 
include whether his prosecution for charges not identified in 
Presentment No. 33 violated his constitutional rights under the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.   
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(a). 
Because this is a habeas petition brought by a prisoner 
in state custody,1 the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, applies.  Thus we 
cannot grant relief “with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based 
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  Id. 
§ 2254(d).  Because the District Court did not hold an 
evidentiary hearing, we review its decision de novo.  Thomas 
v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009). 
III. Analysis 
A. We Decline to Expand the Certificate of 
Appealability. 
Romansky asks us to expand the certificate of 
appealability to include the contention that his prosecution and 
trial for crimes not charged in Presentment No. 33 violated his 
constitutional rights.  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) provides that a 
certificate of appealability shall issue only where “the 
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.”  This means “showing that reasonable 
jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the 
                                              
1 Believe it or not, Romansky is still in custody. 
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petition should have been resolved in a different manner.”  
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot 
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, 893 n.4 (1983)).  But jurists of 
reason could not debate whether Romansky’s constitutional 
claim is valid for the simple reason that the Fifth Amendment 
right to indictment by a grand jury has not been incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.  
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).  
Romansky argues that, once a state chooses to adopt a 
grand jury system, it is bound by all the requirements of the 
Grand Jury Clause of the federal Constitution, including the 
rule of Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), that an 
indictment cannot be amended or enlarged except by a grand 
jury.  Although creative, this argument is not supported by any 
authority and is inconsistent with Hurtado.  The reasoning of 
Stirone depends on the fact that, in the federal system, no one 
may be tried for a crime except as charged by a grand jury.  
Naturally, then, an indictment cannot be modified at trial to 
include new crimes without going back to the grand jury.  But 
state governments, including the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, are under no obligation to charge through a 
grand jury, and there is nothing offensive about trying a 
defendant for crimes some of which were charged by a grand 
jury and some of which were not.   
Romansky also seeks an expanded certificate of 
appealability for his claim that the Commonwealth violated his 
right under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by 
withholding Presentment No. 33 from him until well after his 
1987 trial—indeed, until after his 2000 retrial.  The District 
Court considered this contention at length in denying it, see 
Romansky, 2017 WL 810689, at *19–25, and we conclude that 
jurists of reason would not debate whether it was correctly 
resolved.   
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Thus we decline to expand the certificate of 
appealability to include either of these issues. 
B. Romansky’s Petition is Not Timely As To the 
1987 Trial. 
Romansky’s main claim before us is that his due process 
rights were violated when he was tried for a crime different 
from the one charged.  The Sixth Amendment provides that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation.”  And the Supreme Court has held that 
“[c]onviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of 
due process.”  De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937); 
see Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948) (“No principle 
of procedural due process is more clearly established than that 
notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial 
of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the 
constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding 
in all courts, state or federal.”). 
This claim concerns the events surrounding 
Romansky’s first trial in 1987, and so before we can address 
the merits of his argument we must first decide whether his 
habeas petition was timely filed as to the undisturbed 
conspiracy conviction in the 1987 trial.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) 
states that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”  This limitations 
period begins running from any of several dates identified in 
the statute; the relevant one for our purposes is “the date on 
which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”  
Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).  This restriction on habeas actions was 
adopted by AEDPA in 1996, and so, for cases where final 
judgment had already been entered before AEDPA was 
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adopted, the limitations period began on AEDPA’s effective 
date and expired on April 23, 1997.  See Burns v. Morton, 134 
F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998).  The statute also provides that 
“[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State 
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 
toward any period of limitation under this section.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(2).  Because Romansky’s post-conviction claim as 
to his 1987 trial was not resolved until November 1997, the 
limitations period would have expired one year later, in 
November 1998.   
This petition was not filed until 2009, yet Romansky 
argues it is nonetheless timely as to the 1987 conspiracy 
conviction because of his retrial and resentencing in 2000 on 
other, previously vacated, convictions.  The Commonwealth 
does not dispute that the petition is timely as to the 2000 trial: 
Romansky’s state post-conviction motions were filed less than 
one year after his time for seeking appeal in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had expired, and his federal petition was filed 
while the state post-conviction proceedings were still ongoing.  
But Romansky claims that the 2000 resentencing for non-
conspiracy convictions in effect reset the clock for any claims 
pertaining to the 1987 trial, and invokes Magwood, 561 U.S. at 
342, in support of this claim.  We disagree, and therefore 
conclude that any claims pertaining to Romansky’s first trial 
are not properly a part of his current habeas petition. 
Magwood concerned a separate requirement of the 
AEDPA habeas rules, specifically the limits on “second or 
successive” petitions.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).  There a death 
row inmate had filed one federal habeas petition attacking his 
sentence and been afforded relief.  After resentencing he filed 
another federal petition; the State of Alabama argued that this 
was a “second or successive” petition and that, because he 
could have challenged his initial sentence on similar grounds, 
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his claims must be dismissed.  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
reasoning that Magwood “challenge[d] a new judgment for the 
first time.”  561 U.S. at 324.  It rejected Alabama’s “claim-
based” view of the “second or successive” rule, instead 
adopting a “judgment-based” rule.  Id. at 331.   
The Court expressly left open, however, whether “a 
petitioner who obtains a conditional writ as to his sentence 
[can] file a subsequent application challenging not only his 
resulting, new sentence but also his original, undisturbed 
conviction.”  Id. at 342 (emphases in original).  “The State 
believe[d] this result follows because a sentence and 
conviction form a single ‘judgment’ for purposes of habeas 
review,” but the Court held the case “gives us no occasion to 
address that question, because Magwood has not attempted to 
challenge his underlying conviction.”  Id.   
The Circuits have split on this question, with the 
Second, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all 
concluding that a petition after resentencing challenging an 
undisturbed conviction is not “second or successive.”  For 
these courts, the new sentence acts as a new judgment and thus 
provides a reset window to challenge the underlying conviction 
even if it was never disturbed.  See Johnson v. United States, 
623 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139, 141–
42 (4th Cir. 2017); King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 158 (6th 
Cir. 2015); Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1127–28 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, 755 
F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).2  Two Circuits 
                                              
2 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has taken a more nuanced 
position.  See In re Lampton, 667 F.3d 585, 588–89 (5th Cir. 
2012).  There, it seemed to acknowledge that, under Magwood, 
a petition would not be second or successive if a new sentence 
has been imposed for an undisturbed conviction.  But because 
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have gone the other way.  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that its 
pre-Magwood precedent to the contrary was not disturbed, as 
Magwood expressly declined to address the issue.  Suggs v. 
United States, 705 F.3d 279, 282–83 (7th Cir. 2013). The Tenth 
Circuit relied on pre-Magwood precedent from our Circuit 
without mentioning Magwood.  Prendergast v. Clements, 699 
F.3d 1182, 1186–88 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Fielder v. Varner, 
379 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2004)).   
Romansky urges us to adopt the majority view and hold 
that his resentencing in 2000 formed a new judgment as to the 
undisturbed convictions from the 1987 trial. If so, his current 
habeas petition is timely as to the events of that trial.  But the 
question we have is slightly different from the one left open in 
Magwood.  There the issue was whether, when a defendant is 
resentenced on a given charge (such as capital murder), the 
new judgment includes the underlying conviction as well as the 
sentence.  Here it is whether, where some but not all counts of 
conviction are disturbed on appeal or in post-conviction 
proceedings, the defendant’s eventual resentencing is a new 
judgment as to the undisturbed counts of conviction.   
                                              
Lampton’s prior petition, successfully challenging one of his 
convictions under the Double Jeopardy Clause, had merely 
resulted in having that conviction vacated with no change in 
the sentence for any other count of conviction, the Court held 
that there had been no such intervening judgment.  Thus it 
appears that the Fifth Circuit largely agrees with the majority 
rule, although it may take a narrower view of when a new 
judgment has been imposed than, for example, the Second 
Circuit in Johnson, 623 F.3d at 45–46 (finding that an amended 
judgment had been entered on all counts of conviction in 
essentially identical circumstances to Lampton). 
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We conclude the answer is no.  The sentence imposed 
in 2000 after retrial was not a new judgment on the undisturbed 
counts of conviction.  This is plain from considering a 
counterfactual (that is, hypothetical) in which Romansky was 
acquitted on all charges during the retrial for the vacated 
counts.  In that case there would have been no new sentence: 
instead he would simply have continued serving out his 
sentence on the undisturbed counts.  Romansky conceded at 
oral argument that in this scenario the time limits for filing his 
federal habeas petition would not have been reset in 2000.  If 
an acquittal at retrial would not change the undisturbed 
conviction, Romansky’s argument that a conviction should 
have such an effect is illogical. 
Nor did the 2000 sentencing order impose a new 
sentence as to the undisturbed counts.  Instead it imposed 
sentences for the charges on retrial, and then stated that they 
would “run consecutively to the sentence imposed on [the 
undisturbed counts] on December 17, 1987.”  Potentially the 
result could be different in a court system using the “sentencing 
package” doctrine, where a trial court will undertake a de novo 
resentencing as to all counts of conviction if any count is 
vacated on appeal, under the theory that the sentencing judge 
would “craft a disposition in which the sentences on the 
various counts form part of an overall plan.”  United States v. 
Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States 
v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 1997)).  In that case the 
resentencing might constitute a new judgment as to every count 
of conviction, at least if we were to follow the majority 
approach to the open question in Magwood.  Here, however, 
the Pennsylvania counts imposed separate sentences for each 
count and conducted only a “limited” resentencing after the 
retrial.  See Miller, 594 F.3d at 179–80 (explaining the concept 
of “limited resentencing”).   
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In summary, we conclude that Romansky’s habeas 
petition was not timely as to the conspiracy conviction at his 
1987 trial because the petition was not filed within one year of 
the conclusion of his state post-conviction process and because 
the 2000 resentencing did not impose a new judgment as to the 
undisturbed counts of conviction (including the conspiracy 
charge).  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal 
of Romansky’s claim that he was denied due process by the 
purported discrepancy between the charging documents and 
the jury instructions as to the nature of the conspiracy charge 
against him. 
C. Romansky Was Not Denied the Effective 
Assistance of Counsel. 
Romansky also asserts he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel when his lawyer during the 2000 retrial 
and resentencing refused to raise the issue of the 1987 
conspiracy-charge discrepancy despite repeated requests that 
he do so.  Because this pertains to events in 2000, it is 
undoubtedly timely.  We nonetheless conclude that Romansky 
is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a 
defendant must show (1) deficient performance and (2) 
prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  The first prong requires a showing that “counsel’s 
performance . . . fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness;” the second requires demonstrating “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).  To award Romansky relief 
on his ineffectiveness claim, we would need to conclude that 
his lawyer behaved unreasonably by failing to raise this issue 
at the time of the resentencing and that, had he done so, 
15 
 
Romansky likely would have obtained relief (or at least that 
this was reasonably possible). 
Here, Romansky’s ineffectiveness claim fails because 
the conspiracy charge was not at issue during the 2000 retrial, 
but only those counts of conviction the Superior Court had 
vacated in 1997.  There was no basis for Romansky’s counsel 
to raise any argument related to that conviction during the 
retrial.  Moreover, we doubt Romansky would have been 
afforded any relief had he done so.  Thus his counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to raise the issue, and in any event that 
failure may not have prejudiced Romansky. 
To the extent he claims that his counsel during the retrial 
was ineffective for failing to file a post-conviction claim on his 
behalf challenging the conspiracy conviction, it is well 
established that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not 
extend to post-conviction proceedings.  See Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).  Rather it extends only to trial and 
“to the first appeal of right.”  Id. at 555.  This claim of 
ineffective assistance would therefore fail as a threshold 
matter, as Romansky had no constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel in filing such a collateral attack on his 
conspiracy conviction. 
IV. Conclusion 
Though the history of this case is lengthy and 
convoluted, the question before us is ultimately quite simple.  
Romansky was convicted in 1987 and, after some but not all 
counts of conviction were vacated, retried and again convicted 
on those counts in 2000.  Romansky now believes he has found 
an error in the 1987 trial regarding the conspiracy charge that 
was never vacated.  So did the retrial and resentencing in 2000 
gave him another bite at the apple to raise this issue in a federal 
habeas petition?  We think not.  The new sentence imposed in 
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2000 was not a new judgment on the undisturbed counts of 
conviction from the 1987 trial.  Therefore, neither Magwood 
nor any of its possible implications apply to our case. 
Accordingly, Romansky’s principal claim—that he was 
deprived of due process by the discrepancy between the 
conspiracy charge as described in the charging documents and 
the charge as presented to the jury—is not properly before us 
because his habeas petition was not timely filed as to events 
pertaining to his 1987 trial.  His ancillary claim of ineffective 
assistance fails because the conspiracy conviction was not at 
issue during the 2000 retrial.  And his request that we expand 
our certificate of appealability fails, as his claim under the 
Grand Jury Clause is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent 
from the Nineteenth Century and he has not made a substantial 
showing as to his Brady claim. 
Thus we affirm. 
 
